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Introduction
Political participation has been a perennial concern for students of democracy. Definitions of democracy often make participation the concept's leitmotif (Tussman 1960, 105; Cohen 1973, 7; Pennock 1979, 445) . Even when not included in the definition, participation is high among the conditions of democracy (Dahl 1971, 1-6; Powell 1982, 2-4) . Participation is considered so crucial that some critics of Western polyarchies call them "thin democracy" instead of "strong democracy," which "is a distinctively modern form of participatory democracy" (Barber 1984, 117) .
A large corpus has analyzed participation from diverse perspectives (for recent reviews, see Conway 1985 Conway , 1989 Bennett and Bennett 1986; Nagel 1987) . Many of the early empirical studies were explicitly grounded in normative democratic theory. Their authors often had as a goal testing propositions derived from what was called "the classical theory of democracy" (Berelson 1952; Almond and Verba 1963) . Recent scholarship has either revised the empirical find- 772 Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick ings of early behavioral studies or dealt with more technical aspects of research. Studies often either ignore normative theory or cite a traditional work or two before getting down to the "serious" issues at hand.
In this paper normative democratic theory and empirical research are brought to bear on several questions about nonvoting and democracy in America. The questions have been posed by theorists from Aristotle to proponents of participatory democracy. Most of the data come from nationwide surveys conducted during the 1980s, although some use will be made of surveys from the 1960s and 1970s. The National Opinion Research Center's 1985 General Social Survey and Gallup's April-May 1987 poll (GO8701 1) for "The People, Press, and Politics" will be used. We also draw heavily on the Center for Political Studies' 1984 , 1986 and lightly on the 1964 , 1968 , 1972 , and 1976 The National Election Studies are used because they include a wide variety of items that touch on issues related to participation and democracy and the CPS conducted voter validation studies in 1964, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1986, and 1988 . Where possible, students of participation prefer to rely on validated rather than reported turnout. Fortunately, Sigelman (1982) has shown that reported or validated turnout work equally well. The 1985 GSS and Gallup's 1987 poll can be used, therefore, because even though they contain only reported turnout, they plumb important issues raised by normative theorists. Although the 1985 GSS and Gallup's 1987 poll asked about voting well after the 1984 presidential election, reported turnout was 71% in the first and 73% in the second, figures identical to the 73% reported turnout found by the 1984 NES.2
The paper has two main parts. First, we describe arguments derived from ' The data come from the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies' 1968 Studies' , 1972 Studies' , 1976 Studies' , 1984 Studies' , 1986 Studies' , and 1988 National Election Studies, the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center's 1985 General Social Survey, and Gallup's 1987 "The People, Press, and Politics" poll conducted for the Times Mirror Company. All but the last were released by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Gallup's 1987 poll was released to the senior author by the Gallup Organization with the assistance of Curtis Gans of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate.
2We recognize that moving from one survey to the next throughout the bulk of the paper can be confusing, and we apologize. It would be best if we had one or two recent surveys that contain identical questions across the plethora of topics we intend to plumb, but no such vehicle exists. We have chosen the most recent surveys lest our findings be excessively outdated. Where possible, we report data from two or more surveys lest conclusions be drawn prematurely. Unfortunately, we must do precisely that in a few instances. We also realize that confusion can occur when reported vote is used in some instances and validated turnout is employed in others. Where possible, as in the NES's, we have checked to see whether any differences arise when validated rather than reported turnout is used. There is only one consistent difference: the relationship between reported turnout and trust in government is slightly stronger than that between validated vote and trust. Even there, no substantively important differences emerge. Other results are almost identical. We try, nonetheless, to let the reader know when we are relying on validated vote and when we use reported turnout.
IMPLICATIONS OF NONVOTING 773 normative theory and consider the controversies swirling about them. Second, we test two major questions with survey data: (1) if they were to vote, would nonvoters constitute a threat to American democracy; and (2) does nonvoting produce potentially skewed public policies?
Theoretical Arguments about Participation
Democratic theorists have constructed many arguments about the importance of participation (see, e.g., Pateman 1970; Parry 1972; Held 1987) . Most focus on the salubrious effects of participation and the deleterious consequences of nonparticipation for the individual and the democratic system. First, we want to dispense with arguments about participation that seem to be empirical but actually render empirical evidence irrelevant. These arguments assume that in any "true" democracy the full participation of the citizenry is a sign of its health and that nonparticipation is an indication of system failure. According to Cohen (1973, 10) , "Every variety of nonparticipation is a flaw in a democracy." These assertions belong to the realm of conceptual analysis and rest on the theorist's understanding of democracy's meaning. If it is asserted that democracy is distinguished from other political systems by the fact that the people rule, and since they do this by participating, it follows that any lack of participation must mean the system is in trouble. If the most fundamental criterion of a fully functioning democratic system is citizen participation, then a decline in political activity must entail a decline in democracy.
Arguments of this type leave little room for empirical findings; they offer no independent way to measure the effects of participation on a democracy. In order to utilize empirical evidence, it is necessary to have some criteria for the good or bad effects of participation on a democratic polity that are relatively independent of what constitutes a "good" or "healthy" democracy.
Participation and Legitimacy
There are three major categories of truly empirical arguments about participation's value for democracy. One claims that "legitimacy" is an important positive effect resulting from participation in a democracy. Participation is said to be "a legitimizing act" (Salisbury 1975, 326) . "The legitimacy of a democratic leadership and the health of the democratic process depend squarely on the informed and active participation of the electorate" (Gans 1978, 54) . By participating in politics, citizens give their consent to elites' decisions and to the regime itself. Hence, it is often asserted that the greater the participation, the more legitimate a democracy, which is said to be a prerequisite for stability (Salisbury 1975, 327) .
This argument assumes that participation is necessary for the system's legitimacy and stability, and thus nonparticipation is a symptom of systemic disorder or will allow antidemocratic forces to take over. According to Hutchins 774 Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick (1952, 80) , "The death of democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush. It will be a slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment."
The legitimacy argument may be a disguised version of the tautological argument already described: democracy requires participation; no participation, no democracy. Even if it were genuinely empirical, it does not take seriously the fact that there is always a rate of participation correlated with a functioning democracy. As Gans notes (1978, 55) , "There is . . . no foreordained optimal level of political participation." The problem is to specify the rate or range necessary for democracy to function (see Powell 1982) .
Participation and Citizen Empowerment
The "instrumental" argument for the value of participation contends that by participating, ordinary people exercise control over political elites (Parry 1972, 19-26) . Since the people are the best judges of their own interests, they have a right to participate in politics to protect themselves against elites' depredations. Although the relationship between taking part in public affairs and political influence is not perfect, the argument assumes that "a situation which results in high participation by members of a group normally has higher potential for democracy ... than is one where few people show interest or participate in the political process" (Lipset 1981, 184) .
The focus of the instrumental perspective on participation is largely on public policy. According to Walker (1966, 288) , "The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy." Many of the arguments about the negative effects of nonparticipation on democracy also relate to its effects on public policy. Nonvoting is said to skew policy in the direction of participants because "politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote" (Key 1949, 527) . As Key shows (1961, 186-89) , policy skews could occur when high participators' domestic and foreign policy opinions differ substantially from those of low participators.
Nonvoting is also alleged to introduce class and racial biases into policy processes (Burnham, 1987) . Often this argument denies that nonparticipation is voluntary; it is seen as a conscious or nonconscious form of domination by the ruling class, race, or gender. The heart of this argument is that increasing participation will result in a shift toward more egalitarian policies. To bring the claim full circle, increased participation is alleged to make public policy more "democratic" (Piven and Cloward 1988) .
At the very least, it can be said that the presence of a substantial number of nonvoters has the potential to alter dramatically the balance of partisan power in American politics (Schattschneider 1960, 98-111) . Hadley (1978, 113) argues that large "numbers of [nonvoters] hang over the democratic process like a bomb, ready to explode and change the course of our history as they have twice in our past." Just before Jackson's election in 1828 and FDR's selection in 1932, nonvoters rose to about 45% of the voting age population. In each instance, when they abruptly entered the electorate, "sudden radical shifts of power . occurred" (Hadley 1978, 113) .
The policy skew argument may not be true. If nonparticipants took part in public affairs, they may not want what the critics think they do. Studies of the policy and party preferences of voters and nonvoters indicate that, with the possible exceptions of 1980 and 1984 (Petrocik 1987 , had nonvoters gone to the polls, neither Democrats nor liberal policies would necessarily have benefited (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; De Nardo 1980; Shaffer 1982; Gant and Lyons 1988) . In addition, "some might feel that a sudden rush to the polls that produces another Andrew Jackson or Franklin Roosevelt is something to be longed for, not feared" (Ranny 1983, 17) .
Even if the policy skew argument were true, it actually hinges on an evaluation of policy, not of participation. If nonparticipants were found to be rightwing fanatics, many advocates for participation would be much less sanguine. This argument depends on dogmatic egalitarian ideology. Some advocates of participation based on purely process values either implicitly or explicitly assume that there would be "good" outcomes, that is, ones they approve (see, e.g., Piven and Cloward 1988, 8-9) . Such people are often impervious to empirical arguments; they have the "false consciousness" trump card in reserve if reality does not conform to ideology.
Participation and Self-Development
Other arguments focus on participation's effects on the individual. According to Berlin (1969, lviii) , "Participation in self-government is, like justice, a basic human requirement, an end in itself." Democracy's proponents argued that "all (or most) [people] have deliberative and moral potentiality that given the proper education and environment, each could take his [or her] place in the deliberative forum and share the responsibilities of sovereignty" (Tussman 1960, 105 ). Tussman's democrats wanted people to participate "not simply in order to get more, but primarily in order to develop [their] deliberative and moral character and to achieve the dignity of being a ruler of the society in which [they are] a member."
This view is often linked with the "developmental" perspective of John Stuart Mill ([1861 Mill ([ ] 1958 , who held that participation in public affairs not only enabled people to protect their own interests (43-44), but also encouraged intellectual and moral development to the fullest (53-54). The "citizenship" theorists believed that political activity is intrinsically valuable, since it offers ordinary people the opportunity for becoming more competent citizens (Thompson 776 Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick 1970, 13-22) . By participating, people not only learn more about their own interests but also develop a better understanding of other groups' needs (Walker 1966, 288; Parry 1972, 26-31) .
It is often said that nonparticipation is bad because of its effects on the individual nonparticipant. This is supported by some variety of the Aristotelian assumption: participation is a good that every normal human being desires (Barker 1958, 6-7) , and its corollary, that nonparticipation is a symptom of some psychological abnormality or sickness, often thought to be caused by the political system.
Old Questions, New Data
Reviewing some of the theoretical questions that have been asked about democratic participation reveals what a daunting prospect awaits those who would seek their resolution with current data. The gulf between critics of modern democracies and behavioral research probably explains why "rarely do empiricist and theoretical critic join hands, or even arguments" (Pennock 1979, 438) . Still, the effort is worthwhile. Specifically, we seek to determine whether: (1) if they were to vote, nonvoters would constitute a threat to American democracy; and (2) nonvoting introduces a substantial policy skew.3 Each question deals with the impact of nonvoting on the democratic system.
Since the developmental question looks at the impact of participation on the individual, its resolution takes us in substantially different directions. Therefore, we take up the question of whether participation has any palpable consequences for the individual as a person elsewhere.
Does Nonvoting Threaten Democracy?
In democracies where turnout averages 85-90% of the potential electorate, it is highly unlikely that nonvoters, by themselves, could constitute a significant threat. Even if every nonvoter suddenly voted for an antidemocratic movement, they would be swamped by adherents of traditional democratic parties if the latter remained steadfast in established voting habits. Crossover voting apparently played a substantial role in the Nazis' growth after 1930 (Childers 1983, 142) .
But where nonvoters constitute approximately 30% of the "adult citizens who could vote if they were willing to make the (usually minimal) effort" (Ranney 1983, 16) , as in the United States, the possibility exists that their sudden emergence into the electorate could fundamentally change the governmental process. We ignore whether nonvoters' sudden mobilization might result in partisan realignment and consider only whether it could be a possible threat to the democratic order.
'Although the surveys we use indicate that participation in other forms of activity introduces different kinds of policy skews, we leave that topic to another paper. Since voting is the most widely engaged in form of political activity, we feel it deserves the attention it gets here.
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The following types of nonvoters could pose a potential threat to democracy: (1) those who reject democracy in favor of an antidemocratic system; (2) those who endorse democracy in the abstract, but reject specific applications of democratic procedures, for example, opposing civil liberties for unpopular groups; (3) racial, religious, and ethnic bigots who could be mobilized to cast ballots supportive of bigotry; or (4) those who are so politically ignorant they could easily be manipulated to vote in ways inimical to democracy. There are other possible cases, but these seem to be the most likely. What evidence can be adduced from recent surveys conducted in the United States?
Nonvoting and alienation. There is little evidence that nonvoters are less supportive of democratic ideals than voters. Democracy is the system of choice for virtually all Americans. According to Sniderman (1981, 104, 141) , "The idea of America envelops Americans.... The American at large, even if uncommonly active and politically articulate, does not entertain the notion that some other form of political order is preferable, even if he is bitterly unhappy with the present one."
Two recent nationwide surveys asked about patriotism and reaction to symbols such as the flag and the national anthem. Gallup's 1987 poll asked whether people agreed or disagreed that "I am very patriotic." There was a small difference in the responses of reported voters and nonvoters in the 1984 presidential election. Eighty-seven percent of nonvoters agreed, as did 94% of voters. Only 13% of nonvoters disagreed, as did 6% of voters. Although the relationship is statistically significant (X2 = 49.81, df = 1, p < .001), it is weak (4 = .11).4
Figure 1 depicts data from the 1988 NES showing that nonvoters and voters do not react much differently to questions about how it feels to be an American. People were asked about how they feel when they see the American flag flying, how strongly they love their country, how emotional they feel when listening to the national anthem, and how proud they are to be an American. Responses to the four questions were combined to form the American "patriotism" index. Shown in the figure is the percentage of validated nonvoters and voters falling into five categories on the index: very patriotic, slightly patriotic, neutral, slightly nonpatriotic, and very nonpatriotic.5 4With the exception of the differences of means reported on the opinion thermometer data (see Table 2 ), we use chi-square to estimate the significance of the tables on which most of the data are based, despite the test's sensitivity to large numbers. Because 4,244 individuals were interviewed for the 1987 Gallup poll, most chi-squares calculated on the entire sample will achieve statistical "significance." We use three measures of association: 4 for fourfold tables, Kendall's tau-c where we can assume rank ordering, and eta when the inclusion of "don't know" dictates sensitivity to nonlinear relationships.
'It is difficult to decide what to label categories 4 and 5. No opprobrium should be attached to those falling into them.
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Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick Nonvoters are slightly less likely to be very patriotic, and slightly more likely to fall into the neutral category. Although the relationship is significant (X2 = 24.54, df = 4, p < .001), it is weak (Kendall's tau-c = -.12). Less than 10% of nonvoters or voters admit to having negative feelings when asked questions like those making up the "patriotism" index. At least when queried about their patriotism and how it feels to be an American, nonvoters do not differ greatly from voters.6 Still, if it should be found that nonvoters are substantially more likely than voters to prefer other forms of government, concern becomes well founded. For example, what if nonvoters held a more favorable view of communism as a form of government than did voters? NORC's 1985 General Social Survey asked "How do you feel about communism as a form of government."
The 1985 GSS certainly dispells all fears about nonvoters' preference for communism. Their views were virtually indistinguishable from those of voters. Over half the reported nonvoters in the 1984 election (56%) believed communism is "the worst kind of all"; a quarter (26%) said it was "bad, but no worse than some others"; 15% thought it was "all right for some countries"; and a trace element (2%) felt it was "a good form of government." Three-fifths of voters (60%) said communism was the worst kind of government; 27% thought it was bad but no worse than others; 12% felt it was all right for some countries; 6Most of the difference is due to the fact that young people, who are much less likely than the middle-aged and elderly to vote, are also less likely to be very patriotic on the "patriotism" index. and 1% believed it was a good form of government. The relationship is significant (X2 = 7.78, df = 3, p = .05), but very weak (tau-c = -.04). 7 Those who do not vote could strongly support democracy in principle but still be profoundly alienated from "the system," or at least its current leadership, perhaps because they think elites have betrayed democratic ideals. This is precisely the point made by Parenti (1977, 208) , who regards abstention, particularly by the lower social orders, as "a justifiable reaction to a politics that is meaningless in its electoral content and disappointing in its policy results." Noting that the rise in nonvoting after 1960 is concentrated among the economically disadvantaged, Reiter (1987, 135) argues that "it is hard to imagine that this largely low-income group refrains from voting because they are satisfied with the system." When one recalls that the downturn in turnout after 1960 coincided with a dramatic decline in public trust and confidence (Lipset and Schneider 1987) , the temptation to assume the two are related is understandable. Four points should be made, however. First, while it is true that nonvoters are more likely to have lower internal and external political efficacy beliefs, lurking behind inefficaciousness and nonvoting is educational attainment (Lipset and Schneider 1987, 341) .
Second, political cynicism increased among voters as well as nonvoters between 1964 and 1988. In 1964, 48% of validated nonvoters were trustful of government, as were 45% of voters, while 27% of nonvoters and 26% of voters were cynical. In 1988 only 15% of nonvoters were trustful, as were 16% of voters, while 66% of nonvoters and 61% of voters were distrustful.
Third, there is virtually no relationship between a four-item version of the SRC's trust in government measure8 and validated turnout in 1964 , 1976 , 1980 , 1984 , for example, 46% of the very trustful were validated voters, as were 62% of the slightly trustful and those in the "neutral" category, 59% of the slightly mistrustful, and 54% of the very mistrustful. As was the case in each year, the relationship was not statistically significant (X2 = 3.87, df = 4, p = .06). These data support Hill and Luttbeg's (1983, 138) conclusion that "a majority of the alienated continue to express some hope for and faith in our system of government by turning out to vote in presidential elections." Lipset and Schneider (1987, 342) argue that cynicism and nonvoting are unrelated because, unlike efficacy, cynicism is tied not to education but to intense partisan and ideological proclivities. "Strong partisans and ideologues are more-not less-likely to vote. They have the strongest views about politics, including discontent over the way things are being run, and they express those views at the polls." 70f course, it is possible that someone might reject communism and democracy, but such individuals almost never show up in surveys.
8We do not include, "Do government officials know what they are doing?" because an affirmative response could indicate either trustful or cynical sentiments.
Fourth, and most important, it is unlikely that the SRC's standard measure of trust in government truly taps alienation from the system. More likely, it elicits discontent with incumbents, much of it rooted in partisan disgruntlement (Abramson and Finifter 1981) .
Two items asked by the CPS in 1972 and 1976 come closer to tapping alienation from the system. The first asked whether "to solve the problems facing our country," a big change was needed "in our form of government," some change, or no change was necessary. The second inquired whether the respondent was "proud of many things about our form of government" or whether he or she could not "find much in our government to be proud of." Respondents who felt big changes were needed in America's form of government and could not find much to be proud of could be said to be "alienated," while those who were proud of the American form of government and wanted it left as is could be said to be "allegiant." Other responses can be classified as "mixed." This categorization scheme is highly sanitized, since the items do not specify what "big" changes people had in mind, or why they might lack pride in the American "form of government." Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the political alienation index and reported turnout in 1972 and 1976. As these data show, there is a relationship between attitudes about the American political system and turnout. However, while the relationship in each year is significant (p < .001), the association is quite weak (tau-c = -.09 in 1972 and -.14 in 1976). The 1976 Voter Validation Study shows that 46% of the "alienated" actually voted, compared to 59% of those with "mixed" views and 69% of the "allegiant." Only a tenth of the public was "alienated" in 1972 and 1976, while the remainder was about evenly divided between the "mixed" and "allegiant" categories. That means only 17% of validated nonvoters in 1976 could be considered "alienated," even by means of a fairly tame classification scheme. It is highly unlikely that a substantial proportion of nonvoters are profoundly alienated from the American political system.
Nor, if Gallup's 1987 poll can be believed, are nonvoters more likely than voters to favor throwing "the bums" out of Washington in favor of an entirely new cast of characters. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree that "it is time for Washington politicians to step aside and make room for new leaders," and "we need new people in Washington even if they are not as effective as experienced politicians." Responses to the two items were combined to create an "anti-Washington politicians" index. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the index and reported turnout in 1984. As the figure shows, nonvoters were no more likely than voters to favor sweeping current Washington leaders out and were only slightly less likely to reject the idea of wholesale replacement. Although the relationship is statistically significant (X2 = 23.55, df = 4, p < .001), it is extremely weak (tau-c = .05). The data in this section show that American nonvoters are not substantially dif- 
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Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick ferent from voters in their love of country, rejection of communism as a system of government, distrust of public officials, and "alienation" from the system. In addition, nonvoters are no more likely to favor sweeping changes in current governmental officialdom.
Nonvoting and civil libertarianism. Nor can it be said that nonvoters constitute a threat to basic civil liberties. For those seeking to determine whether nonvoters constitute a potentially anti-civil libertarian threat, the 1985 GSS and Gallup's 1987 poll are treasure troves. The GSS included standard Stouffer-type questions about civil liberties for atheists, admitted communists, white racists, militarists, and homosexuals (NORC 1987) . The GSS also included several new items. Two asked about whether a newspaper that had obtained confidential government papers about "defense plans" and "economic plans" should be permitted to publish them, or whether the government should be able to prevent it. Another asked whether people should always obey the law or whether they should follow their conscience even if it meant breaking the law. Six items asked whether people or groups should be allowed to undertake various actions to "protest against a government action they strongly oppose." Finally, NORC asked three items about the civil liberties of "people who want to overthrow the government by revolution" and three about civil liberties for "people who believe whites are racially superior to all other races."
Gallup's "The People, the Press, and Politics" poll asked nine items that box the compass of current civil libertarian controversies: (1) "mandatory drug tests for government employees"; (2) "proposals to limit the access that AIDS patients have to public places"; (3) "school boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals"; (4) "books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries"; (5) "nude magazines and X-rated movies provide harmless adult entertainment for those who enjoy it"; (6) "freedom of speech should not extend to groups like the Communist party or the Ku Klux Klan"; (7) "the police should be allowed to search the houses of known drug dealers without a court order"; (8) "the government ought to be able to censor news stories that it feels threaten national security"; and (9) "the news media should be free to report on any stories they feel are in the national interest."
When the nine items were entered into a maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation, all but five and nine were found to load on the first dimension at or above .35. The seven items loading on the first dimension were combined into a "civil libertarianism" index. Table 1 compares the distributions of voters and nonvoters on individual items and on indices that tap support for a variety of groups' civil liberties.9 9Indices that tap civil liberties for atheists, admitted communists, white racists, militarists, and homosexuals are built from the standard three Stouffer questions (NORC 1987, 114, 116-19 alndex constructed from five items: (1) should people be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government; (2) should they be allowed to publish pamphlets to protest against the government; (3) should they be allowed to organize protest marches and demonstrations; (4) should they be allowed to occupy a government office and stop work there for several days; and (5) should they be allowed to organize a nationwide strike of all workers against the government. (1985 GSS).
blndex constructed from three questions: (1) should the group be allowed to hold public meetings to express their views; (2) should such a person be allowed to teach 15 year olds in school; and (3) should the group be allowed to publish books expressing their views. (1985 GSS) cStandard Stouffer-type items. (1985 GSS) dlndex constructed from seven items: (1) mandatory drug tests for government employees; (2) limit AIDS patients' access to public places; (3) permit school boards to fire teachers who are known homosexuals; (4) ban books containing dangerous ideas from public school libraries; (5) groups like the KKK and the Communist party should not have freedom of speech; (6) the police should be able to search the houses of known drug dealers without a court order; and (7) government should be able to censor news stories it thinks threaten national security. (Gallup's 1987 "The People, Press, and Politics" poll).
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Essentially, these data do not show that nonvoters constitute a potential anti-civil libertarian threat. Occasionally, nonvoters are slightly more civil libertarian than voters; sometimes they are just slightly less so. Although there are differences, they are mostly within sampling error. It would be erroneous to conclude that nonvoters are candidates for the ACLU. Seventy percent would forbid newspapers to publish defense plans, and half would allow the government to censor a newspaper story about its economic plans. Nearly two-fifths would have American citizens obey every law without regard to their conscience, and a quarter offered low support for even mild forms of civil disobedience. Depending on the group in question, somewhere from a quarter to nearly two-fifths might be willing to put basic civil liberties at risk. The Gallup data show that nonvoters are slightly more anti-than pro-civil libertarian. But the central message of Table 1 is that voters, who should be more socialized into democratic norms if the theory of political participation were correct, provide no firmer foundation upon which to base civil liberties than do the nonvoters. If it is true that ordinary people are the soft underbelly of civil libertarianism, voters are just as paunchy as nonvoters.
Nonvoters and bigotry. Nor if 1984 Nor if , 1986 Nor if , and 1988 NES data are to be believed, can it be concluded that nonvoters are bigots who, if they suddenly began voting, would threaten minorities, the poor, and the downtrodden. Table 2 presents voters' and nonvoters' mean opinion thermometer ratings of 10 groups: blacks, civil rights leaders, black militants, Hispanics, poor people, people on welfare, gays and lesbians, the women's liberation movement, fundamentalist Christians, and antiabortionists. Also shown are the significance levels as established by a two-tailed difference of means test.
One should not place too much weight on opinion thermometer ratings as indicators of prejudice. It would be easy for a crypto-racist to mislead a survey interviewer by rating blacks favorably while harboring hostile sentiments. Still, since there is no reason to think nonvoters would be more likely than voters to dissemble on opinion thermometer questions, these data provide at least some evidence concerning nonvoters' relative penchant for bigotry.
These data show nonvoters are no more or less likely to report negative feelings toward most of the groups asked about in 1984, 1986, and 1988 . With few exceptions, the two voter categories' mean opinion thermometer (OT) ratings are virtually identical. Where they do significantly depart, nonvoters are slightly less friendly toward Hispanics, and more friendly toward fundamentalist general civil libertarianism index is an additive composite of five of the six items (NORC 1987, 363-64) . We felt that the item asking about "seriously damaging government buildings" was just too far beyond the pale. The second white racists' civil liberties index and the revolutionaries' civil liberties index were each built from three items (NORC 1987, 365-66) . For the specific items about newspapers and obeying the law versus obeying one's conscience, see NORC (1987, 362 Christians and people on welfare, and less hostile toward black militants.'0 In 1988 nonvoters were significantly more hostile toward gays and lesbians. Although the OT ratings do not remove all doubts about nonvoters' views on racial, religious, and ethnic minorities, they provide some grounds for optimism. One question raised by Table 2 is whether nonvoters constitute a potential threat to homosexuals' civil liberties. Data from Gallup's 1987 poll and the 1988 NES show that nonvoters are little more likely than voters to agree that school boards should be permitted to fire teachers who are openly homosexual (53% vs. 50%), and somewhat less likely to favor laws that would protect homosexuals from job discrimination (44% vs. 50%). In both instances, the relationship is statistically significant but quite weak. Finally, one should recall from Table 2 that voters also express negative feelings for gays and lesbians. Additionally, Gallup's 1987 poll shows that voters are no more likely to favor increased spending for research on AIDS (69% vs. 67%), and almost as likely to favor limiting AIDS patients' access to public places (39% vs. 43%).
'?The fact that blacks constitute 16% of the nonvoters but only 9% of the voters may account for at least a small portion of these findings.
Lest the reader cease to worry about any potential threat to democracy from nonvoters, two observations should be made: one methodological, one substantive. First, surveys may miss those most likely to be nonvoters, anti-civil libertarian, and bigoted. Surveys have a large percentage of nonrespondents (25%; Smith 1983), and although most object to being interviewed for unrelated reasons, some may refuse because they harbor authoritarian and prejudiced sentiments. Hence, the evidence presented so far may underestimate a potential threat from nonvoters.
Nonvoters and political information. The substantive observation refers to the fact that nonvoters are a good deal more politically ignorant than voters. In 1986 the CPS asked which governmental position was held by George Bush, Caspar Weinberger, William Rehnquist, Paul Volcker, Robert Dole, and Tip O'Neill. Nonvoters got an average of 1.6 correct out of a possible six; voters got an average of 2.6 correct (t = -13.94, df = 2095, p < .001). NES asked about the political jobs held by Ted Kennedy, George Schultz, William Rehnquist, Mikhail Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, Yasir Arafat, and Jim Wright. Nonvoters got an average of 2.2 right out of seven, while voters' mean correct score was 3.5 (t = -15.77, df = 1767, p < .001).
When the CPS asked which party had held more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives before the 1984 election and which had won more seats in 1984, 56% of nonvoters missed both questions, and only 24% answered both correctly. Among voters, 29% missed both questions, and 54% got both right. When the CPS also asked which party had held more Senate seats before the 1984 election and which had won more seats, 68% of nonvoters missed both, and only 16% got both correct. Voters did a little better; 54% missed both, and 33% got both right. In 1988, 54% of nonvoters could not say which party held more seats in the House of Representatives or in the Senate before the election, while 15% answered one correctly, and 31% got both right. Only 21% of voters did not answer either question correctly, while 17% got one right, and 62% knew the Democrats had had more seats in both houses before the election.
Not only do nonvoters perform poorly on tests of "stray facts," they also do badly on tests calling for a much wider variety of political information and knowledge. Using the CPS's 1984 NES, Bennett (1988) created a measure of "know-nothingism" that includes contextual knowledge, information about the presidential candidates' and political parties' policy positions, as well as simpler information. Using this measure, 43% of 1984 nonvoters were "knownothings," compared to 23% of voters. Only 7% of nonvoters could be classified as well informed, compared to 20% of the voters. Two-thirds to three-quarters of the strength of the relationship between political information and turnout is retained even when education is held constant.
Granted, nonvoters are generally ill informed about public affairs. Nonethe-
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Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick less, nonvoters are not, for the most part, completely ignorant. Most nonvoters knew at least something on the "know-nothing" measure. Second, voters are hardly paragons of civic virtue when it comes to political information. Schumpeter's (1975, 262) claim that "the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field" applies more to nonvoters, but it can hardly be said that most voters have an ample backlog of political information. Ignorant nonvoters may not constitute a threat to democracy, but they contribute to the debasement of the currency of public discourse, a coinage already weakened by low levels of political information among voters. It appears that contemporary American nonvoters do not constitute a palpable threat to democracy per se or to civil liberties. Nor do they appear to be particularly unfriendly toward most racial or sociopolitical minorities, although they are a good deal less informed about public affairs. The primary reason that nonvoters do not constitute a potential threat is, as Hadley (1978) showed, that people do not vote for a variety of reasons. Hadley uncovered six different categories of "refrainers" (nonvoters) in the 1976 presidential election, only two of which, "the bypassed" and "the politically impotent," appear even remotely likely to include persons who might harbor sentiments inimical to democracy. Since the bypassed and the politically impotent made up only 35% of all nonvoters, it becomes easier to understand why nonvoters as a group do not presently pose a hazard to democracy in America.
Of course, no one can say what might happen should an economic catastrophe of the Great Depression's magnitude befall America, or even if racial and political strife such as the country experienced in the 1960s were to recur. The best evidence suggests that if economic calamity should energize nonvoters, they would most likely support one of the major parties' candidates, probably the out party at the onset of the disaster (Andersen 1979) . Although some feared that turmoil in the late 1960s would lead to an American form of "friendly fascism," the best George Wallace could achieve was 13.5% of the vote in 1968. The SRC's 1968 NES shows that he had mobilized some nonvoters; 29% of Wallace's voters said they had not gone to the polls in 1964, nearly a fifth having been too young to vote. By contrast, 15% of Humphrey's supporters and 18% of Nixon's had not voted in 1964. In that sense, Wallace benefited most from nonvoters' entry into the electorate.
Interestingly, once in the electorate, the Wallaceites did not return to the woodwork in 1972. The overwhelming bulk of them supported mainstream candidates once Wallace was no longer a candidate. The 1972 NES shows that only 16% of Wallace's 1968 voters dropped out of the electorate in 1972, while 64% voted for Nixon, 17% backed McGovern (!), and 3% said they voted for John Schmitz. The evidence presented so far indicates that when it comes to democracy, nonvoting presently seems to be primarily a cipher, not a threat.
Does Nonvoting Skew Policy?
Although not a threat to democracy, nonvoting could skew the policy opinions likely to be "heard" by officialdom. Table 3 presents the partisan leanings and ideological proclivities of validated voters and nonvoters in the 1984, 1986, and 1988 elections, along with their policy opinions on seven policy questions and five spending items that were asked in identical forms in each year. The items available on the 1984, 1986, and 1988 questionnaires are limited, but they offer a good mix of domestic and foreign policy topics.
The data in Table 3 indicate that nonvoting could introduce a skew into the policymaking process, although its size and direction varies from issue to issue. There is also a small element of partisan and ideological bias due to nonvoting, one that varies from year to year.
Foreign policy opinions. Let us take up foreign policy opinions first. It does not appear that the entry of nonvoters into the electorate would affect U.S. foreign policy in two key areas: spending for defense and relations with the Soviet Union. On these, the balance of opinion is about the same for voters and nonvoters. The main exception is a tendency in 1988 for voters to be slightly more in favor of cooperation with the Soviet Union (40% vs. 33%). In the main the most notable difference on these foreign policy issues is nonvoters' greater tendency to say they do not know or have no opinion.
There is one foreign policy area, however, where nonvoters and voters consistently have different views. Asked whether the United States "would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world," nonvoters were 10%-13% more likely than voters to be isolationists. Gallup's 1987 poll also found nonvoters were less likely to completely agree that "it's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs" (26% vs. 36%). Other than that general issue, we can put aside foreign affairs as a likely prospect for skewed policies due to nonvoting. Domestic policy opinions. Domestic issues present a mixed picture. Nonvoters and voters do not differ significantly on abortion or government assistance to minorities. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Services, it is important to discover that nonvoters' abortion opinions do not differ substantially from those of voters. By remanding abortion to the "political thicket" of state legislatures, the Court's decision has led "prolife" and "pro-choice" forces to call for drives to mobilize more supporters. The data in Table 3 suggest that should current nonvoters be mobilized, neither side will gain appreciably.
When asked about other domestic policies, however, nonvoters and voters do not see eye to eye. Nonvoters are slightly more in favor of an increased Table 3 . Nonvoters' and Voters' Policy Opinions, Partisanship, and Ideology, 1984 , 1986 1984 1986 Nonvoters Voters Nonvoters Voters Nonvoters Voters Topic S % S S % % government role in the domestic arena. They are more likely to oppose curtailing government spending for health and education services, and they are more likely to support government guarantees that everyone has a job and a good standard of living. Gallup's 1987 poll also suggests that nonvoters are slightly more in favor of a positive service state. Three items were combined to form an "opinions on the welfare state" index. "I Twenty percent of reported nonvoters in the 1984 election were very much in favor of the welfare state; 40% were slightly in favor; 25% were neutral; 13% were slightly opposed to the welfare state; and 2% were very opposed. Among reported voters, 15% were very pro-welfare; 34% were slightly in favor; 30% were neutral; 17% were slightly opposed; and 4% were very much against the welfare state. The relationship was significant (X2 = 38.42, df = 4, p < .001), but weak (tau-c = .10). It is on the spending items where the biggest differences between voters and nonvoters occur in Table 3 . Nonvoters would have federal spending increased for social security, food stamps, and, to a lesser degree, to improve blacks' conditions. Although voters would also support more money for Social Security, they are less supportive than nonvoters.
The gap between nonvoters' and voters' views about government spending for domestic programs becomes especially noticeable when opinions on several are combined into an additive "opinions on domestic spending" index. In the interest of space, we present data only from the 1988 NES, but the same pattern holds for similar indices constructed for the 1984 and 1986 NES's, the 1985 GSS, and Gallup's 1987 poll. Figure 4 presents validated nonvoters' and voters' opinions on the "domestic spending" index for 1988. The index is an additive combination of opinions about federal spending for eight domestic programs: social security, food stamps, assistance for the unemployed, programs that assist blacks, child care, public schools, care for the elderly, and care for the homeless. All eight loaded on the initial underlying dimension uncovered by a maximum likelihood factor analysis of 15 spending items that were on the 1988 NES. The eight items are a nice mix of the broad range of programs that constitute the modern service state.
As Figure 4 shows, although voters cannot be said to be resoundingly opposed to greater federal spending on domestic programs, nonvoters are more strongly in favor of increased outlays (30% vs. 20%). The relationship is significant (X2 = 30.38, df = 4, p < .001), although fairly weak (tau-c = .14). The key point, however, is that if nonvoters in 1988 had joined the electorate and if their opinions about increased spending on a number of domestic programs had "The three items are: "it is the responsibility of government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves"; "the government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper into debt"; and "the government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep." been heard by elected officialdom, there would be even more pressure for increased outlays in the post-Reagan era than has been the case so far. The data suggest that there is a policy skew on several domestic programs, with nonvoters favoring greater government spending. But the spending items should be interpreted cautiously. Unlike seven-point issue questions, the CPS does not provide a screen for nonsubstantive responses when asking opinions about government spending. Since screening for nonsubstantive replies increases the percentage of "conservative" opinions (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1983, 539) , Table 3 and Figure 4 may overestimate prospending sentiment. This methodological artifact may be slightly greater among nonvoters, since filters affect the politically apathetic more than the interested (Francis and Busch 1975, 215-16) .
The 1988 NES provides some evidence of a greater inconsistency among nonvoters' opinions on spending issues. When asked to agree or disagree that "the government ought to cut taxes even if it means putting off some important things that need to be done," validated nonvoters were at once slightly more likely than voters to agree strongly (11% vs. 7%) and less likely to disagree strongly (13% vs. 20%). Nonvoters were more likely to say either that they did not know or that they neither agreed nor disagreed (25% vs. 16%). The 1988 NES also shows greater inconsistency between nonvoters' views on the domestic spending index and their willingness to pay more in federal taxes to reduce the budget deficit. Voters who were in favor of increased federal spending were considerably more willing to pay more in federal taxes than were voters opposed to more budgetary outlays. Among nonvoters, however, there was virtually no relationship between opinions about domestic spending and willingness to pay more in federal taxes. In short, nonvoters' opinions on the spending items appear more conflicted than voters' opinions do.
Partisanship and ideology. The data on partisanship and ideology in Table  3 provide additional cautionary notes. Nonvoters' entry into the electorate would not alter its ideological makeup, unless one were to assume a simultaneous decline in the percentage of nonsubstantive responses to the ideology question as they began to vote. Nonvoters are 14%-18% more likely to refrain from placing themselves on the ideological scale, and they are less ideologically polarized than are voters. The table also shows that any partisan shifts resulting from a decline in nonvoting would vary from year to year. In 1984 the electorate would have been slightly more Democratic. In 1986 and 1988, the Democrats would have had no benefit other than a slight decrease in the size of the GOP's adherents because nonvoters were twice as likely as voters to identify with no party.
Presidential voting. Of course, the key question, which Table 3 does not address, is how nonvoters would cast their ballots. De Nardo (1980) thinks the joke would be on the Democrats, while Petrocik (1987) believes they might have the last laugh. Our reading of NES data indicates that Reagan's victory margin over Carter in 1980 would have narrowed by slightly less than 2%, but his margin over Mondale in 1984 would have increased by 4%, if validated nonvoters had cast ballots for the candidate they claimed to favor. Had validated nonvoters with preferences entered the electorate in 1988, Bush's popular vote margin over Dukakis would have increased by four-tenths of a percent. In no instance would the last three presidential elections' outcomes have been different.
Opinions about political economy. It may be premature to conclude that nonparticipation's policy impact can be dismissed. Schattschneider's (1960) point that a substantial shift in the substance of the policy agenda might induce nonvoters to vote may have merit. Many scholars contend that the political culture, political parties, and the electoral process work to limit the range of realistic options open to the public, putting candidates and parties that call for a fundamental restructuring of the American political economy at a particular disadvantage (see, e.g., Hartz 1955; Lipset 1979; Burnham 1982) . Some contend that were a major party, especially the Democrats, to call for profound restructuring of the economic system, many nonvoters who find today's partisan agenda unappealing would enter the electorate to back a new leftist agenda. According to Burnham (1987, 49) , given "the demographics and the class composition of the 'party of nonvoters,' there seems little reason to doubt that these would be largely Democratic voters . . . or left voters if the political system and political culture had ever made room for a left party in the schedule of alternatives offered in the American electoral market." Since NES's concentrate on the policy options "offered in the American electoral market," opinions about government ownership and control of industry are rarely asked. The 1985 GSS asked, "What do you think the government's role in each of these industries should be": electric power, local mass transportation, the steel industry, banking and insurance, and the automobile industry. The options included "own it," "control prices and profits but not own it," and "neither own it nor control prices and profits." Figure 5 presents the opinions on a "socialism" index of reported nonvoters and voters in the 1984 election. These data show that nonvoters and voters do not have significantly different opinions about government ownership and control of key industries (X2 = 2.85, df = 4, p = .58, tau-c = .07). Moreover, only a tiny fragment of nonvoters is strongly in favor of government ownership or control of industry, fewer than half the proportion of nonvoters who are strongly against a "socialized" economy.
Nor are nonvoters more overtly hostile toward business than voters. Four items on Gallup's 1987 poll were combined to form an "opinions about business" index.'2 One percent of reported nonvoters in the 1984 election were very probusiness; 16% were slightly probusiness; 34% were neutral; 46% were slightly antibusiness; and 3% were very antibusiness. One percent of reported voters were very probusiness; 23% were slightly probusiness; 30% were neutral; 42% were slightly antibusiness; and 4% were very antibusiness. The relationship was significant (X2 = 20.24, df = 4, p < .001), but extremely weak (tau-c = -.04).
Critics of American society might argue that these are instances of false consciousness. They allege that given the failure of a major party to articulate a truly leftist agenda (Burnham 1982 (Burnham , 1987 Piven and Cloward 1988) , and the drumbeat of antisocialist propaganda by the privately owned, probusiness mass media (Parenti 1986 ), many Americans are prevented from appreciating the benefits of a socialized economy. Some contend that were it not for the distortions created by the party system, the media, and the electoral system, the powerful strain of egalitarianism running through American political culture, which is thought to be particularly prevalent among the large sectors of the working class that do not now vote, would show up more clearly on the political agenda if more nonvoters were to enter the electorate (see, e.g., Piven and Cloward 1988, 3-21) .
There is a strain of egalitarianism in American political culture, one that is often at odds with a similarly strong individualist ethic (Lipset 1979) . But are nonvoters significantly more egalitarian than voters? The 1984 The , 1986 NES's provide an answer. Each year a battery of items tapped opinions on equality in America: (1) "Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed"; (2) "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country"; (3) "This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are"; (4) "It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others"; (5) "If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems"; and (6) "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance."
After items 2, 3, and 4 were recoded, the six were added to form the "egali-'2The four items are: "the strength of this country today is mostly based on the success of American business"; "business corporations generally strike a fair balance between making profits and serving the public interest"; "there is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few big companies"; and "business corporations make too much profit." The last two items were recoded. posed to the idea: 17% thought it definitely should be government's responsibility to reduce income differences; 18% believe it probably should be; 27% said it probably should not be; and 38% felt it definitely should not be. The relationship was significant (X2 = 11.45, df = 3, p = .01), but weak (tau-c = . 11).
The data in this section put the instances where policy skews do crop up into a better perspective. Nonvoters do not always, or even usually, differ from voters in their policy opinions, views on socialism, or their egalitarianism. Therefore, elected public officials, even if they have finely tuned antennas, may not always be able to discriminate between their voting and nonvoting constituents' policy opinions.
Conclusion
Our goal was to use contemporary data to answer some questions that normative theorists have asked about nonvoting. We hope to provide direction for future efforts of this nature. There is good evidence that, if they were to begin voting, nonvoters do not pose a palpable threat to democracy or to unpopular political groups' civil liberties. Also, although nonvoters are ill informed about public affairs, voters are hardly paragons of civic virtue. Second, nonvoting does not skew most foreign policies, but it does have an impact on some domestic policies, especially spending on welfare state programs. Third, nonvoters are not more egalitarian than voters, or more hostile to business, or more in favor of extensive government ownership and control of key industries.
Looking at the analyses presented here, some might be tempted to conclude that we can stop worrying about nonvoting's potentially adverse consequences. That would be premature on two grounds. First, no one can say what might happen were economic calamity or profound sociocultural dislocations to recur. Had FDR not been able to give the appearance of dealing with the worst effects of the Great Depression during his first term, would the previous nonvoters who voted Democratic in 1936 have stayed at home, voted for one of the left parties, or backed William Lemke's Union party? Had the tumults of 1968-70 not been quieted by 1972, how might George Wallace have fared if he had not been physically unable to campaign after Bremmer's assassination attempt? No one can say, but since nonvoters lack habitual patterns of backing established parties, they lend a potential volatility that analysts such as Hadley (1978) have correctly identified.
The second cause for concern is perhaps more basic. Nonvoters consistently express higher rates, sometimes much higher, of "don't knows" and "no opinions" to a wide range of political issues. Nonvoters are much more likely to be without a voice when it comes to many of today's important political issues.
People "without voice" are not represented. They are more akin to "subjects" than to the "citizens" who English and American proponents of popular sovereignty "invented" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Morgan 1988 ). Orren (1987, 77) rightly notes that "the desire to be elected and reelected directs representatives' attention to the needs and hopes of the electorate." It may be true that nonvoters' and voters' opinions on many political issues are indistinguishable, but it is equally true that large numbers of nonvoters grant enhanced importance to the small number of intense activists (Orren 1987) , whose views are different, from nonvoters and from voting specialists (Verba and Nie 1972) .
A large proportion of nonvoters means officials will be disproportionately in thrall to intense issue activists, who come largely from the higher social orders (Verba and Nie 1972 ; for more recent evidence, see Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988) . If voting makes elites attend to citizens' opinions, its fundamental value to democracy is firmly established. A ballot may be, as some contend, a very blunt instrument for tying elites' behavior to ordinary people's wishes. But just as the proverbial Missouri mule's attention could be captured by applying a twoby-four to his forehead, so also have elections occasionally been successful in refocusing public officials' attention to the electorate's desires.
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